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Innovation and Regulation in Financial Markets*
A Summary of the 2007 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum
nnovation and Regulation in Financial 
Markets” was the topic of our seventh 
annual Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, 
held on November 30, 2007.  This event, 
sponsored by the Bank’s Research Department, brought 
together economic scholars, policymakers, and market 
economists to discuss and debate the consequences of 
financial innovation and the implications for financial 
market regulation.  The recent events in financial markets 
and their effects on the real sector of the economy 
underscore the importance of greater understanding and 
further research on these topics.
The planning for our 2007 Policy 
Forum began well before the onset of 
the financial market disruptions in the 
summer of 2007.  By the time of our 
conference on November 30, 2007, the 
timeliness of the topic – innovation 
and regulation in financial markets – 
could not be denied.  The continued 
problems in the financial markets, 
which began with subprime mort-
gages but expanded to other financial 
instruments, the ensuing spillovers 
from the financial market disruptions 
to the real sector of the economy, and 
the steps taken by the Federal Reserve 
and the U.S. Treasury to help ensure 
financial stability have led to various 
proposals for new regulatory struc-
tures to help limit systemic risk in our 
evolving financial markets.  Given the 
importance of the financial markets to 
our economy, it is vital that we get the 
reforms right.  Better understanding of 
the pros and cons of financial innova-
tion and financial market regulation – 
the topic of our 2007 Policy Forum – is 
an important step in doing so.   
Charles Plosser, president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila-
delphia, provided opening remarks 
and outlined the Policy Forum’s three 
sessions. He pointed out that whenever 
there is innovation, regulation often 
follows. By its very nature innovation is 
a messy process with winners and los-
ers.  Market discipline is an important 
part of the process, helping to weed 
out flawed from beneficial innovations. 
But the fact that there are winners and 
losers sets up an environment that is 
ripe for regulation.  
Our first session addressed issues 
in corporate governance. In financial 
markets, the innovation of high-yield 
bonds contributed to a boom in corpo-
rate restructuring and buyouts, which 
in turn led to changes in corporate 
governance structures.  The boom and 
bust in technology stocks highlighted 
some of the shortcomings of these 
new governance structures, leading 
to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002. Some have argued that 
Congress was too quick to act. Plosser 
asked whether there were lessons to be 
learned for our current situation.
Our second session examined sev-
eral innovations in financial markets 
and the role regulation may play in 
helping innovations yield more ef-
ficient economic outcomes. Regulation 
and innovation are interrelated – regu-
lation, or the desire to evade regula-
tion, can help spur innovation. Some 
of these innovations may be inefficient 
and some may fail, causing painful 
corrections. The current situation is 
a case in point. Better understanding 
of the interplay between innovation 
and regulation may help us avoid these 
types of situations in the future.
Our third session covered the 
role of regulation in financial markets.  
Technology can spur innovation, but 
regulation also affects the way mar-
kets function. For example, different 
regulatory structures can affect the 
competitiveness of financial markets. 
*The views expressed here are those of the au-
thor and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or 
the Federal Reserve System.As Plosser pointed out, there are 
subtle trade-offs in the benefits and 
costs of particular types of regulation, 
and these have implications for the 
health of financial markets.  Thus, 
assessing the costs and benefits will be 
an important part of redesigning our 
financial market regulatory structure.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE1 
Roberta Romano, of the Yale 
University Law School, began the first 
session with a discussion of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act and its effect on cor-
porate governance.  Romano pointed 
out that the act was passed swiftly with 
little opposition, but since then, some 
flaws in the act have become apparent 
and four major commission reports on 
the act have been published.  (One of 
these, by the Committee on Capital 
Market Regulation, was discussed by 
committee co-chair R. Glenn Hubbard 
in the final session of our Policy Fo-
rum.)  Two criticisms are that the costs 
of compliance are disproportionately 
high for smaller public firms and that 
there has been an adverse impact on 
U.S. capital markets’ competitiveness.  
Some have recommended that small 
firms and foreign firms be exempted.  
The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) has rejected those recom-
mendations, but it has tried to lower 
the compliance burden on small firms 
and has made it easier for foreign firms 
to de-register and leave U.S. markets.  
The rationale for the latter is that 
foreign firms may be less reluctant to 
enter U.S. markets if they feel the costs 
of leaving are not too high.  
Romano’s research has attempted 
to assess the probability that the act 
will be revised.2   This involves as-
sessing the political climate for such a 
revision, which is usually difficult even 
when a piece of legislation’s flaws are 
apparent.  As part of her assessment, 
she has examined how Sarbanes-Oxley 
has been covered by the business 
press.  Coverage of Sarbanes-Oxley has 
increased over time, with the national 
press focusing more on the issue of 
competitiveness and the regional press 
covering both issues of competitiveness 
and small-firm impact.  As coverage 
has increased, so have congressional 
hearings into Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
introduction of bills that call for some 
revisions to the act, most of these 
focused on exemptions for small firms 
and/or community banks.  However, 
Romano pointed out that it took over 
60 years to repeal the Glass-Steagall 
Act, which separated commercial 
banking from investment banking, and 
she thinks it would take a major shift 
in the political environment before re-
vision of Sarbanes-Oxley would move 
quickly.  She said that despite increas-
ing dissatisfaction with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, it could take some time 
before its flaws are addressed, given 
the difficulty in altering the status quo 
within our political system.
Bengt Holmstrom, of the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, 
continued the discussion on corporate 
governance.  He took two perspec-
tives: the first as a member of a board 
of directors and the second as an 
academic who has studied the issue.  
Holmstrom has been on the boards of 
several companies, including a family 
firm for 20 years and Nokia, the global 
mobile telecommunications company, 
for the past nine years.  In his view, the 
academic literature on the corporate 
governance scandals hasn’t understood 
the reason the scandals occurred 
because it hasn’t understood the role of 
the board.  The corporate governance 
discussion has focused too much on 
executive compensation.  In Holm-
strom’s view, everyone agrees that we 
got executive compensation wrong, but 
the literature attributes this to weak 
boards and their failure to intervene.  
It concludes that the corporate gover-
nance system is fundamentally flawed 
and therefore in need of wholesale 
reform, with shareholders gaining 
significantly more power.  Holmstrom 
disagrees.  He pointed out that if you 
look at the longer record of the U.S. 
corporate governance system, it has 
performed extraordinarily well and 
there is nothing better elsewhere in the 
world.  He cautioned that a wholesale 
change would be difficult to unwind, 
as Romano pointed out earlier.  Thus, 
it is important to understand the 
source of the corporate governance 
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scandals in 2000 before advocating a 
completely different system.3 
In Holmstrom’s view, flaws in 
the design of executive compensa-
tion schemes, which gave executives 
powerful incentives to act on their 
own behalf rather than on the behalf 
of stockholders, did contribute to 
the accounting scandals.  But weak 
auditing systems, which allowed the 
executives to act in this way, were also 
part of the problem.  Some argue that 
the scandals occurred because the 
board members weren’t strong enough 
against the executives, and therefore, 
stockholders need to be given more 
rights in intervening in the running of 
the firm.  Holmstrom says that there 
will be costs associated with such a 
system.  His experience suggests that 
boards should not be watchdogs over 
CEOs.  Instead, the board’s role is to 
evaluate whether the CEO and man-
agement know what they are doing 
and have the ability to get the firm out 
of a crisis should one arise – to evalu-
ate the management team’s capabilities 
for running the firm, not to determine 
whether the team is pilfering the firm.  
The board needs a trusting relation-
ship with the CEO; it needs open 
communication to know how the CEO 
approaches problems in order to assess 
whether this is the right person to be 
running the company.  It would be 
difficult to have such a relationship 
if the board were always investigat-
ing the CEO.  Holmstrom believes 
one needs to consider how proposed 
reforms would affect the communica-
tion relationship between the board 
and CEO.  If shareholders can inter-
vene significantly into how the firm 
is run this could adversely affect this 
communication relationship.  While 
Holmstrom believes that shareholders 
should have the right to fire the board, 
he doesn’t believe they should be able 
to fire one member selectively, since 
that might prevent board members 
from effectively doing their job.  
Holmstrom is also skeptical of 
some of the reforms being proposed 
for executive compensation schemes.  
For example, the use of options in 
executive compensation schemes arose 
because of problems with the perfor-
mance plans used in the 1960s and 
1970s.  Now the pendulum has swung 
back to such plans in which account-
ing numbers are used as triggers for 
how much to pay people.  Holmstrom 
prefers payment schemes that are 
simpler but more transparent, since he 
believes such plans would yield better 
incentives.  A compensation scheme 
that aims to give the executive a suffi-
ciently high stake in the firm over time 
should yield better incentives.  
Franklin Allen, of the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania, 
expanded the discussion to corporate 
governance outside the U.S.  Allen 
noted that the notion of a corpora-
tion’s purpose differs across countries.  
When you ask executives (or his MBA 
students) from countries where the 
spoken language is English and those 
from non-English speaking countries 
whom a company is there for, you get 
radically different answers.  Those 
from English-speaking countries say 
the company is there for the share-
holders.  Those from non-English 
speaking countries say it is there for all 
stakeholders–shareholders, employees, 
bondholders, and customers.  If you 
ask whom the company should look 
after if things go bad, you again get 
different answers.  In Japan, 97 percent 
say job security is most important.  In 
Germany and France, a strong major-
ity also favors maintaining employ-
ment.  But in the U.S. and the U.K., 
maintaining dividends is significantly 
more important.    
These differences also mean 
there will be differences in corporate 
governance structures across countries.   
The U.S. and the U.K. have specific 
laws stating that the managers’ duty 
is to the shareholders’ interests.  In 
Germany, employees have a 50 percent 
representation on the firm’s superviso-
ry board, which oversees the manage-
ment board.  Thus, workers’ interests 
are taken into account in the firm’s 
strategic decisions.  China has recently 
introduced mandatory representation 
of workers on boards.  In France, while 
it is not mandatory to have workers 
on boards, workers do have the right 
to attend board meetings.  In Finland, 
companies can choose whether to have 
workers on their boards, and many 
companies have chosen to have worker 
representation.  Allen points out that 
despite the existence of different sys-
tems, the corporate governance litera-
ture has focused only on shareholder 
value, at least until recently.
One question of interest is which 
system is better in terms of allocating 
society’s resources most efficiently.  We 
know from economics that if markets 
are complete, there is no asymmetric 
information, and there is perfect com-
petition, then maximizing shareholder 
3 For further discussion, see Bengt Holmstrom 
and Steven N. Kaplan, “Corporate Governance 
and Merger Activity in the United States: 
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 15 (Spring 2001), pp. 
121-144 and Bengt Holmstrom and Steven 
N. Kaplan, “The State of U.S. Corporate 
Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong,” 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 15 (Winter 
2003), pp. 8-20. Franklin Allen, The Wharton School, 
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value is efficient.  However, if there are 
market imperfections, it isn’t clear this 
yields the best outcome.  Some of Al-
len’s ongoing theoretical research with 
Elena Carletti and Robert Marquez 
indicates that when there are imper-
fect markets, shareholders as well as 
workers may be better off when work-
ers are represented on a firm’s board.4   
Worker representation changes the 
firm’s incentives toward taking actions 
that reduce the chance of bankruptcy.  
This leads to less competition, which 
takes the form of higher prices (which 
hurt consumers), but this in turn leads 
to higher expected profits and in some 
cases higher overall market value than 
when the firm acts only in sharehold-
ers’ interests.  Thus, it is not always 
the case that workers gain at the 
expense of shareholders.  Allen and his 
co-authors are also investigating when 
firms will choose to be stakeholder-
oriented versus shareholder-oriented, 
and what happens in product markets 
when firms of each type compete.  
The auto industry provides such an 
example, with firms from the U.S., 
a shareholder-oriented system, and 
Germany, a stakeholder-oriented 
system, competing.  Questions such as 
these become even more important as 
countries such as China, with different 




Our second session delved into 
financial market innovations with 
speakers who have academic, poli-
cymaking, and market practitioner 
experience.  John Geanakoplos, of 
Yale University, discussed his research 
on the foundations of market liquid-
ity and financial crises.  This research 
yields several policy implications for 
the current period of financial market 
distress.  Geanakoplos noted that the 
interest rate has played a central role 
in economics for more than a century, 
but during crises, collateral levels and 
margins, which he sees as synonymous 
with leverage, become paramount.  
In these situations, the interest rate 
may not move at all, but the economy 
is transformed by radical shifts in 
margins and collateral levels.  Thus, in 
his view policymakers may want to pay 
more attention to collateral levels and 
less attention to interest rates.
Just as supply and demand deter-
mine the interest rate in equilibrium, 
in Geanakoplos’s theory they also 
determine the equilibrium margin.  
There is a leverage cycle in which the 
economy can go from having too much 
leverage to too little.  Consider an 
economy that has too much leverage, 
that is, where margins are very low.  If 
there is a spate of bad news that lowers 
expected values but increases expected 
volatility, individuals may demand 
more margin to cover their higher 
risk, and the situation becomes one in 
which there is too little leverage in the 
market.  Geanakoplos pointed to sev-
eral historical episodes in which there 
were extreme changes in margins: the 
1994 derivatives crisis, 1998 emerg-
ing markets debt crisis, and the 2007 
subprime crisis (and a possible housing 
market crash, which he speculated 
might follow).  
Geanakoplos is a partner of 
Ellington Capital Management, a 
mortgage hedge fund, so he spoke as 
both an academic and a practitioner 
as he elaborated on the subprime 
crisis.  In his view, the problems in 
the subprime market derive from the 
margin requirement, that is, the down 
payment, which prevents subprime 
borrowers from refinancing.  Prior to 
the current crisis, when a subprime 
borrower’s mortgage rate reset at a 
higher level, a borrower that was in 
good standing was able to refinance 
at a lower rate.  Now, both the decline 
in housing prices and the rise in down 
payment requirements have prevented 
such refinancings.  In Geanakoplos’s 
view, the interest rate has not played 
the main role.
In Geanakoplos’s theory, a liquid-
ity crisis begins when bad news about 
an asset lowers its price.  The owners 
of this asset had been the most opti-
mistic buyers and they were leveraged 
because they wanted to invest more 
in the asset than their own resources 
permitted.  The drop in the asset price 
hurts them more than others in the 
economy.  Thus, wealth is redistributed 
away from the asset’s natural buyers, 
and this causes the asset price to fall 
more, which then causes a further 
drop in wealth, and so on.  The crisis 
reaches its climax only when lenders 
then tighten the margin requirements, 
that is, the amount of collateral they 
require to back a loan.  This tightening 
of margins may force investors to sell 
the asset, which leads to even greater 
declines in the asset’s value, and 
there may be spillovers to other asset 
prices if they also need to be sold.  Of 
course, those who manage to survive 
the crisis can benefit from the buy-
ing opportunity provided by the low 
prices of the assets.5  In Geanakoplos’s 
  
4 See Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, and Robert 
Marquez, “Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Value,” Wharton Finan-
cial Institutions Center Working Paper 07-39, 
August 4, 2007.
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economic model, even a small piece of 
bad news, that is, one that results in 
just a small increase in the chance of 
a bad outcome, can have a large effect 
on the price if it results in driving the 
most optimistic buyers (who were the 
most leveraged) out of the market and 
increasing borrowing margins.  The 
leverage cycle, then, has broad implica-
tions for the economy.
While crises are, thankfully, rare 
events, changes in margins and the 
resulting problems happen more fre-
quently.  In some cases, bad news isn’t 
large enough to drive the optimistic 
buyers from the market and create a 
financial crisis.  Instead, it raises un-
certainty and disagreement about the 
future among people so that the less 
optimistic want to sell their assets, and 
the optimists want to buy up the assets 
being sold.  Because margins have 
risen, in order to do that, the optimists 
need to sell some of their other assets, 
an action that causes their prices to 
fall.  Thus, there is some contagion.  
The optimists also want to hold assets 
they can borrow money against, so 
they reallocate their portfolio.  There 
is a flight to quality, a flight away from 
illiquidity. 
Geanakoplos pointed out that an 
important implication of the theory is 
that policymakers might want to focus 
more attention on regulating margins.  
Forcing people to have tighter margins 
in normal times and looser margins 
during crises can make society better 
off.
Randall Kroszner, member of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, discussed the role of 
information in the development of new 
financial products and lessons to be 
learned about risk management and 
regulation to help foster productive 
financial market innovations.  The 
economy has benefited from innova-
tions that have allowed capital to be 
allocated to its most productive uses 
and risks to be dispersed to a wide 
range of market participants.  But in-
novations also create challenges when 
participants don’t have the necessary 
information to value new instruments.  
Kroszner described the typical life-cy-
cle of a new instrument.  When a new 
product is developed, there is usually 
an experimentation phase when mar-
ket participants try to learn about the 
product’s performance and risk charac-
teristics.  The product’s characteristics 
are adjusted in response to market 
demand.  Information is gathered to 
facilitate price discovery, the process 
that reveals the market-clearing price 
of the asset.  Kroszner discussed how 
the lack of information, inadequate 
due-diligence to verify information, 
and lax risk management have cre-
ated problems in the market for some 
structured finance products like SIVS, 
structured investment vehicles.  Their 
complexity and the lack of informa-
tion about where the underlying credit, 
legal, and operational risks reside have 
made these instruments hard to value.  
According to Kroszner, when market 
participants realize they lack the nec-
essary information for price discovery, 
the price discovery process becomes 
disrupted, market liquidity can become 
impaired, and it may take a significant 
amount of investment in information 
gathering and time before the price 
discovery process can be revived.
Investment in information gather-
ing may also result in more standard-
ization of the instrument.  Kroszner 
pointed out several benefits of stan-
dardization.  It can decrease complex-
ity and increase transparency of the 
instruments.  More standardization 
lowers the information-gathering costs, 
and also the transactions costs for the 
instrument, which in turn increases 
market liquidity.  Kroszner suggested 
that improvements in standardization 
could help address some of the current 
challenges in the subprime market, 
perhaps facilitating the workout and 
loan-modification processes.  He said 
that the Federal Reserve and other 
regulators have been actively encourag-
ing mortgage lenders and servicers to 
work with borrowers at risk of losing 
their homes.  Kroszner noted that the 
supervisory agencies and the industry 
are addressing the need for improved 
risk management, including more 
comprehensive due-diligence for new 
financial products, and better stress-
testing to cover contingent exposures, 
market-wide disruptions, and potential 
contagion.
John Bogle, founder and former 
CEO of The Vanguard Group, Inc., 
and president of Bogle Financial 
Markets Research Center – himself a 
financial markets innovator – provided 
his views on when innovation goes 
too far.  In his view, innovation and 
entrepreneurship are major drivers of 
global economic growth, but financial 
innovation is unique because of the 
sharp dichotomy between the value of 
innovation to the financial institution 
and the value of innovation to the 
institution’s customers.  Bogle believes 
5 For further discussion, see John Geanakoplos, 
“Liquidity, Default, and Crashes: Endogenous 
Contracts in General Equilibrium,” Advances 
in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and 
Applications, Eighth World Conference, Volume 
II, Econometric Society Monographs (2003), pp. 
170-205.
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that institutions have a large incen-
tive to favor complex and costly over 
simple and cheap.  He estimates that 
the costs of the financial sector have 
risen from about $100 billion in 1990 
to about $530 billion in 2006.  These 
costs include annual expenses borne 
by mutual fund investors, brokerage 
commissions, investment banking 
fees, fess paid to hedge fund managers, 
and legal, accounting, marketing, and 
advertising costs.  Bogle asks whether 
the costs of the financial sector have 
reached a level that exceeds the value 
of the sector’s many benefits.  
In Bogle’s view, two recent in-
novations in the banking industry – 
CDOs (collateralized debt obligations 
backed by pools of mortgages) and 
SIVs (structured investment vehicles) 
– are complex and costly vehicles of 
questionable benefit.  He discussed a 
number of innovations in the mu-
tual fund industry over the years that 
brought mutual fund managers high 
fees but ultimately losses to investors, 
including aggressive growth funds in 
the latter half of the 1960s, govern-
ment-plus funds in the 1970s, adjust-
able-rate mortgage funds in the 1980s, 
and technology funds in the 1990s.
Bogle explained that some mutual 
fund innovations have benefited fund 
investors.  One of these is the money 
market fund, which he sees as one of 
the greatest innovations in the indus-
try’s history.  He also outlined several 
of the innovations of his own firm, 
Vanguard, which he established in 
1974.  These include a fund organiza-
tional structure that keeps investment 
costs down; the first market-index 
mutual fund, created in May 1975, 
that tracks the returns of the S&P 500 
stock index; and tax-managed funds, 
introduced in 1993.
Bogle concluded by suggesting 
that financial innovations nearly 
always create value for their creators, 
but that too often, in his view, these 
innovations have subtracted value 
from investors.  
REGULATION AND 
COMPETITIVENESS
Bogle’s discussion provided an 
excellent segue into the final session, 
which addressed the proper role of 
regulation in capital markets.  Given 
financial market disruptions that have 
taken place since the Policy Forum, 
this session provides particularly useful 
insights into thinking about the regu-
latory structure that is to come. 
R. Glenn Hubbard, dean of 
the Columbia University Business 
School and chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisers from 2001 to 
2003, focused his discussion on the 
regulation of equity markets, draw-
ing on the work of the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation, a non-
partisan group co-chaired by Hubbard 
and John Thornton, former president 
of Goldman Sachs.  Hubbard sees 
our financial markets as one of the 
important sources of the productivity 
boom in the U.S. over the past decade, 
and thus, it is important to preserve 
and enhance the global competitive 
position of U.S. capital markets.  The 
U.S. share of equity raised in global 
public markets dropped from about 30 
percent in 2002 to about 19 percent in 
2007 (through November).  There has 
been an increase in U.S. companies 
doing initial public offerings abroad 
and a decrease in the number of firms 
that are listing on U.S. equity exchang-
es.  Economic research indicates that, 
on average, foreign firms still receive 
a benefit from listing in the U.S., but 
that listing premium has declined in 
recent years.  Hubbard argued that one 
of the reasons for these trends is that 
the U.S. securities regulatory system 
does not do an adequate assessment 
of the costs and benefits of proposed 
and enacted regulations.  The imple-
mentation of Sarbanes-Oxley could be 
improved to lower its costs.  Another 
cost facing firms doing business in the 
U.S. is potential litigation.  He cited 
issues surrounding auditor and director 
liability and securities class-action 
lawsuits, which have larger and more 
frequent settlements in the U.S. than 
in other financial centers.
The committee recommended 
that a more risk-based approach be 
taken toward securities regulation 
to ensure that regulation enhances 
shareholder value by improving the 
incentives of managers, auditors, and 
directors, and the rights of sharehold-
ers with respect to corporate control.  
This would include the SEC’s per-
forming formal cost-benefit analyses 
of regulations.  Regarding litigation 
reform, the committee recommended 
allowing alternative dispute resolution 
for class actions, which might include 
shareholders waiving their rights to 
class actions at the time of the initial 
public offering.  Hubbard suggested 
that the Financial Services Author-
R. Glenn Hubbard,
Columbia University Business School
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ity in the United Kingdom, which is a 
consolidated system of financial super-
vision, might provide a model worth 
considering in the U.S., and indeed 
the costs and benefits of such a system 
are being assessed as part of the work 
regarding regulatory reforms needed in 
the aftermath of the current financial 
market disruptions.
Annette Nazareth, who at the 
time of the Policy Forum was a com-
missioner at the SEC, was our final 
speaker.  Nazareth argued that a 
well-conceived and balanced system 
of securities regulation gives the U.S. 
a competitive edge in global finan-
cial markets.  The SEC’s balanced 
approach to securities regulation is 
based on the principles of competition, 
transparency, investor protection, and 
market integrity.  Nazareth believes 
the approach has worked well and has 
been instrumental in establishing con-
fidence in the U.S. securities markets, 
which in turn has increased market 
liquidity and has attracted business to 
the U.S.  Indeed, rather than conflict-
ing with market forces, high-quality 
regulation, she feels, is a complement 
that works with market forces.  
In Nazareth’s view, high-quality 
regulation is based on clear goals and 
standards.  It should be minimally 
intrusive in the marketplace, allowing 
disparate business models to compete 
vigorously and effectively, which fosters 
innovation.  It should be flexible 
enough to accommodate different busi-
ness models.  It should promote market 
efficiency.  Nazareth believes securities 
regulation has been most effective in 
addressing market externalities, a type 
of inefficiency.  She outlined four types 
of externalities that regulation has suc-
cessfully addressed: dominant markets, 
principal-agent conflicts, collective-
action issues, and information asym-
metries.  
Markets with high market power 
may use it anti-competitively.  The 
U.S. has multiple competing securi-
ties markets, and the SEC has used its 
authority to enhance the competition 
in these markets.  For example, the 
SEC mandated fair-access rules that 
ensured that all market participants 
would have access to the market.  The 
commission also regulated the sharing 
of market price data, which is neces-
sary for trading.  
As Bogle described in the previous 
session, financial intermediaries and 
their customers are in a principal-agent 
relationship, in which there are some-
times conflicts of interest.  Nazareth 
discussed the SEC’s regulation of 
sales practices, which is intended to 
alleviate some of these conflicts.  She 
pointed out that the U.S. has the high-
est level of retail investor participation 
anywhere in the world and attributes 
this to the standards set for sales 
practices, which inspire confidence in 
our markets. 
The SEC has helped solve col-
lective action problems in financial 
markets.  Nazareth discussed an 
example that arose in the over-the-
counter credit derivatives markets.  As 
Nazareth explained, it was discovered 
that there was a very serious problem 
of incomplete documentation on high 
volumes of transactions in this market.  
Although the securities firms realized 
there was an issue, none individually 
had the incentive or the ability to solve 
the problem on its own.  The SEC has 
worked with the firms toward clearing 
up this problem.
The SEC has advocated transpar-
ency and has mandated standardized 
disclosure to alleviate asymmetric 
information problems.  Globalization 
has led to convergence in disclosure 
as well as accounting standards across 
countries, and this has raised market 
efficiency.
In Nazareth’s view, these four 
types of market imperfections point 
out the need for regulation to ensure 
that the evolution of the marketplace 
benefits investors and serves the public 
interest.  If regulation is well-designed, 
it will enhance competition, not stand 
it is way. 
SUMMARY
The 2007 Policy Forum generated 
lively discussion among the program 
speakers and audience on the conse-
quences of innovation in global finan-
cial markets and the implications for 
financial market regulation.  The re-
cent financial market disruptions, their 
effect on the real sector of the econ-
omy, and the feedback from the real 
economy to financial markets under-
score the need for better understand-
ing of financial market innovations, 
performance, liquidity, and regulation.  
It now appears clear that some reform 
of the financial supervisory system in 
the U.S. is needed and will take place.  
Given the vital importance of finan-
cial markets and institutions to our 
economic well being, it is imperative 
that rigorous economic modeling and 
empirical research be used in develop-
ing these regulatory reforms to avoid 
unintended consequences and to help 
ensure a more efficient and productive 
financial system that is less susceptible 
to systemic risk.  B R
Annette Nazareth, Former Commissioner,
Securities and Exchange Commission